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Stewart I, Ilie D, Zamyatin A, et al. Committing to quantum resistance: a slow defence for Bitcoin against a fast quantum computing attack. R Soc Open Sci. 2018;5(6):180410doi: 10.1098/rsos.180410.
Stewart, I., Ilie, D., Zamyatin, A., Werner, S., Torshizi, M. F., & Knottenbelt, W. J. (2018). Committing to quantum resistance: a slow defence for Bitcoin against a fast quantum computing attack. Royal Society open science, 5(6), 180410. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.180410
Stewart, I, et al. "Committing to quantum resistance: a slow defence for Bitcoin against a fast quantum computing attack." Royal Society open science vol. 5,6 (2018): 180410. doi: https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.180410
Stewart I, Ilie D, Zamyatin A, Werner S, Torshizi MF, Knottenbelt WJ. Committing to quantum resistance: a slow defence for Bitcoin against a fast quantum computing attack. R Soc Open Sci. 2018 Jun 20;5(6):180410. doi: 10.1098/rsos.180410. eCollection 2018 Jun. PMID: 30110420; PMCID: PMC6030263.
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R Soc Open Sci. 2018 Jun 20;5(6):180410. doi: 10.1098/rsos.180410. eCollection 2018 Jun.

Committing to quantum resistance: a slow defence for Bitcoin against a fast quantum computing attack.

Royal Society open science

I Stewart, D Ilie, A Zamyatin, S Werner, M F Torshizi, W J Knottenbelt

Affiliations

  1. Centre for Cryptocurrency Research and Engineering, Imperial College London, London, UK.
  2. SBA Research, 1, Vienna, Austria.

PMID: 30110420 PMCID: PMC6030263 DOI: 10.1098/rsos.180410

Abstract

Quantum computers are expected to have a dramatic impact on numerous fields due to their anticipated ability to solve classes of mathematical problems much more efficiently than their classical counterparts. This particularly applies to domains involving integer factorization and discrete logarithms, such as public key cryptography. In this paper, we consider the threats a quantum-capable adversary could impose on Bitcoin, which currently uses the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) to sign transactions. We then propose a simple but slow commit-delay-reveal protocol, which allows users to securely move their funds from old (non-quantum-resistant) outputs to those adhering to a quantum-resistant digital signature scheme. The transition protocol functions even if ECDSA has already been compromised. While our scheme requires modifications to the Bitcoin protocol, these can be implemented as a soft fork.

Keywords: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm; bitcoin; blockchain; quantum computing; quantum resistance

Conflict of interest statement

We have no competing interests.

References

  1. Nature. 2015 Oct 15;526(7573):410-4 - PubMed
  2. Nature. 2016 Aug 03;536(7614):63-6 - PubMed
  3. Nature. 2018 Mar 29;555(7698):633-637 - PubMed

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