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Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck HJ. Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation. Proc Biol Sci. 2002;269(1494):881-3doi: 10.1098/rspb.2002.1964.
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., & Krambeck, H. J. (2002). Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation. Proceedings. Biological sciences, 269(1494), 881-3. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2002.1964
Milinski, Manfred, et al. "Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation." Proceedings. Biological sciences vol. 269,1494 (2002): 881-3. doi: https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2002.1964
Milinski M, Semmann D, Krambeck HJ. Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation. Proc Biol Sci. 2002 May 07;269(1494):881-3. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2002.1964. PMID: 12028769; PMCID: PMC1690974.
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Proc Biol Sci. 2002 May 07;269(1494):881-3. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2002.1964.

Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation.

Proceedings. Biological sciences

Manfred Milinski, Dirk Semmann, Hans-Jürgen Krambeck

Affiliations

  1. Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max-Planck-Institute of Limnology, 24306 Plön, Germany. [email protected]

PMID: 12028769 PMCID: PMC1690974 DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2002.1964

Abstract

Darwinian evolution can explain human cooperative behaviour among non-kin by either direct or indirect reciprocity. In the latter case one does not expect a return for an altruistic act from the recipient as with direct reciprocity, but from another member of the social group. However, the widespread human behaviour of donating to poor people outside the social group, for example, to charity organizations, that are unlikely to reciprocate indirectly and thus are equivalent to defectors in the game is still an evolutionary puzzle. Here we show experimentally that donations made in public to a well-known relief organization resulted both in increased income (that the donors received from the members of their group) and in enhanced political reputation (they were elected to represent the interests of their group). Donations may thus function as an honest signal for one's social reliability.

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